



Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Cartwright, N. (2009) 'Causality, invariance and policy.', in The Oxford handbook of philosophy of economics.
New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 410-423. Oxford handbooks in philosophy.
Further information on publisher's website:
https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-philosophy-of-economics-9780195189254
Publisher's copyright statement:
This is a draft of a chapter that was accepted for publication by Oxford University Press in the book 'The Oxford
handbook of philosophy of economics' edited by Harold Kincaid and Don Ross and published in 2009.
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
Modeling, Macroeconomics and Development 
Causality, Invariance, and Policy 
 
Chapter 15 






This chapter has five aims: 
1. To explain the puzzling methodology of an important econometric study of 
health and status. 
2. To note the widespread use of invariance in both economic and philosophical 
studies of causality to guarantee that causal knowledge can be used, as we 
have always supposed it can be, to predict the effects of manipulations. 
3. To argue that the kind of invariance seen widely in economic methodology 
succeeds at this job whereas a standard kind of invariance now popular in 
philosophy cannot. 
4. To question the special role of causal knowledge with respect to predictions 
about the effects of manipulations once the importance of adding on 
invariance is recognized. 
5. To draw the despairing conclusion that both causation and invariance are poor 
tools for predicting the outcomes of policy and technology and to pose the 
challenge: what can we offer that works better? 
 1. A Puzzling Study of Health and Status 
It seems being poor is not good for your health. Consider the following remarkable 
observation 
 
Travel from the southeast of downtown Washington DC to Montgomery 
county in Maryland. For each mile travelled life expectancy rises by about a 
year and a half. There is a twenty-year gap between poor blacks at one end of 
the journey and rich whites at the other” 1 . 
 
 This striking quote is from an eminent epidemiologist, Michael Marmot, who 
argues that there is a social gradient in health: The higher your status the better your 
health; and the phenomenon is widespread, observed in the highly unequal United 
States, in more equitable Scandinavia, and even in the illustrious British civil service. 
But how does Marmot know that it is status that is the cause of the health 
differences and not for example the reverse? I want to describe one attempt to answer 
this—a study by Adams, McFadden, et. al., a group of prominent economists 
(including a Nobel prize winner) who use econometric techniques to investigate the 
causal relations between socio-economic status and health among elderly Americans. 
What matters for our discussion here is the way the study tests for causality, in 
particular the fact that it uses two different tests. 
The first test of the Adams, McFadden, et. al.
2
  study looks for 
Correlations between health and status, holding fixed other postulated causes of 
status. 
                                                 
1
 Marmot, 2004 , p.2 
2
 Adams, P., Hurd, M., McFadden, D., Merrill, A., Ribeiro, T., 2003.  
The second looks for 
 Invariance of the estimated correlation across the sample period. Is the 
correlation that obtains in one period the same as that in another? 
 My puzzle was, ‘Why two tests?’ My first thoughts were that the authors are 
cautious. They offer two tests for the same claim interpreted in the same way: Low 
status causes poor health. This suggestion has an initial plausibility. The first test is of 
a kind widely used throughout the social sciences; it is just what we would expect 
under a Suppes—or Granger–style (Suppes 1970; Granger 1969, 424–438) theory of 
probabilistic causality. As for the second, invariance is the central characterizing 
feature of causality under a number of contemporary accounts in both economics and 
philosophy. Since any single test is likely to be flawed, the cautious scientist will aim 
for the convergence of results across different tests for the same thing. 
 If this were the aim though, the specific strategy employed in the study would 
be a mistake. On a variety of current invariance theories of causality it is easy to 
produce scenarios on which Suppes-style causality holds, but the requisite invariance 
does not, for the very reasons that economists from Mill to Lucas, including the 
founders of econometrics, have stressed: The underlying arrangements that give rise 
to economic regularities are often not stable across time and can be highly sensitive to 
interventions. So the two tests must be testing for different things, perhaps two 
different kinds of causality. 
I now think we should interpret the use of two separate tests differently. The 
first is a genuine test for causation.
2
 The second is a test to see whether the causal 
relations confirmed to occur in one period by the first test continue by the same test to 
be confirmed to hold in a second period. The authors themselves claim that the second 
serves as a weak test for the usefulness of the estimated correlation for policy 
prediction. We should like to know 
 
Will the correlations that occur in the data set (and thus the causal relations 
they indicate) be invariant across the envisaged policy changes? 
 
 It is a small indication in that direction that they are invariant at least across 
the period of the data.
3
 
 Following their lead, I think we should interpret the first as a test for causation 
and the second as a step toward showing that the established relation is useful for 
predicting outcomes of proposed policy. This interpretation gives rise to the central 
question of this paper: What makes causal relations especially useful for predicting 
the outcomes of future policy and technology? 
 
2. Invariance in Economics and Philosophy 
This two-step process is not peculiar to the Adams, McFadden et. al. study. It is to be 
found in many other places in the current literature on causality, notably in the 
accounts of James Woodward (2003), Judea Pearl (2000), the Glymour-Spirtes group 
(1993), and in David Hendry’s (2000) work. In each of these, it plays the same role as 
in the Adams, McFadden, et. al. study. Each of these provides an account—a different 
account—of what makes a set of relations causal relations. Causal knowledge is 
valuable because of its importance for policy and planning; we suppose some kind of 
tight connection between causal knowledge and the ability to predict the results of 
manipulations. In all these accounts, it is some kind of invariance assumption that 
secures this connection. 
On the philosophy side, I shall focus on Pearl (2000), Woodward (2003), and 
the Glymour-Spirtes group (1993), both because invariance is an explicit demand in 
their links between causal knowledge and policy prediction and because the link is 
seldom made in other accounts. It is easy to see this point by looking first at an 
account of causation where we might have supposed the link to be immediate, David 
Lewis’s counterfactual account (Lewis 1993 [1973]). For Lewis, C causes E just in 
case C had not occurred, E would not have occurred, where the change from C to ¬C 
is supposed to occur by miracle; that is, nothing changes except C and whatever is 
causally consequent on that. Suppose then that we know with certainty that C causes 
E in this sense. What does that tell us about the effects on E should we manipulate C? 
Nothing—unless we are in a position to perform miracles. No inferences about 
strategies can be drawn from the fact that C causes E on Lewis’s account without 
making additional assumptions. 
This is exactly what both Woodward and Pearl do. Both add the assumption—
the modularity assumption—that miracle-like changes are always possible with 
respect to any factor that can genuinely be counted a cause. Both Woodward and 
Pearl discuss only systems in which the processes connecting causes with their effects 
are discrete: there is always one last set of causal factors (the ‘direct’ causes) that 
operate just before the effect is produced. This provides them with an analogue of 
Lewis’s assumption that the miracle happens at the last instant, which avoids a host of 
counterexamples and inconsistencies. They suppose that C causes E only if the law 
connecting C with the last set of factors that produce it can be replaced with a new 
law that dictates ¬C while nothing else changes that is not causally consequent from 
that. So knowing that C causes E tells us at least this about manipulation: it is actually 
possible for C to change and only C, and if that happens the requisite change in E will 
follow. 
To see this, let us look at Woodward’s work. I concentrate on him because he 
is probably the most vocal champion of invariance. Both Pearl and Woodward focus 
on systems of linear equations of a familiar sort, which I call linear deterministic 
causal systems with probability measures. The same form is also compatible with the 
more general Glymour-Spirtes scheme. 
A linear deterministic causal system with probabilities looks like this: 
x1 c= u1 
xn c= Σanixi + un 
Prob(u1, . . . ,un) = . . . 
where the u’s represent quantities not caused by any of the x’s, and the symbol c= 
means that the left- and right-hand side are equal and that the factors on the right are 
the direct causes of those on the left. Different theories of causality place a variety of 
different constraints on Prob(u1, . . . ,un). In characterizing a linear causal system with 
probabilities, I take a minimalist stand and include none of these constraints. The 
system is defined by its triangular form, which reflects a number of usual assumptions 
about causality, for example, that causality is irreflexive and asymmetric. 
For Woodward, two demands must be fulfilled for equations like these to be 
properly labeled “causal.” 
 
 Level invariance: The equation must remain invariant under any changes 
on right-hand-side variables ‘by intervention’. EDITOR: it is essential that 
the quotes stay here. They indicate that this is a special usage to be 
cautious of – so-called ‘scare quotes’(An intervention on a factor changes 
the law linking that factor with its direct causes to a law that sets that factor 
at some specified value, with no other changes than those causally 
consequent on that.) 
 Modularity: There must be some way to change the other causal relations 
in a system that leaves any genuine causal relation invariant. 
 
 Within a linear deterministic causal system, if we assume that any functionally 
true association derives from the basic causal principles of the system, it can be 
shown that being level invariant is a sufficient condition for a functionally true 
association to be one of the basic causal principles (Cartwright, 2007). So level 
invariance can be seen as a representation of the triangular structure of a causal 
system and the underlying facts about causality that it reflects. 
What then of modularity? Both Woodward and Pearl demand not only that a 
system of causal equations be triangular in form but also that it be modular. Why do 
they build this additional demand into their characterization of causality? The effect 
of this requirement is that each variable in a system
4
 can be changed (by changing the 
law that governs it) as if by miracle, without changing anything else except the effects 
of that variable. What justifies this as a condition on causality? Woodward and Pearl 
both give the same reason as Adams, McFadden, et. al:
5
 this addition allows us to use 
the relation in question to predict what will happen under manipulation. That is, I take 
it, why Woodward calls his account of causality indifferently an “invariance” account 
and a “manipulability” account. 
The special kind of miracle-like interventions envisaged by Lewis, Pearl, and 
Woodward are important for manipulability in Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines (1993) 
as well. Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines (1993) have a “manipulation theorem” that 
tells how to calculate facts about the new probabilities that occur after one of these 
special interventions from facts about the probabilities and causal relations that obtain 
before (Spirtes, Glymour & Scheines 1993, 75–81). But they are more cautious in 
their claims than Woodward and Pearl, for they do not assume modularity—that is, 
they do not assume that such interventions are always possible. Rather, they show 
how to calculate what would follow were such an intervention to occur. 
 
3. A More Useful Kind of Invariance 
Modularity thus secures a sure connection between causality and predictability under 
manipulation. But how satisfying is this connection? In fact it will allow us to use a 
given causal relation for very few policy manipulations. That is because the kind of 
manipulations under which it guarantees invariance—and hence predictability from 
the laws of the system—are very special. They are just the kinds of “surgical 
incisions” that we would demand in a controlled experiment, and these are very unlike 
real policy changes. 
First, in policy cases we have little guarantee that causal processes are 
discrete; and even where they are we seldom are in control of the direct causes of a 
factor we consider manipulating to produce some desired effects. Second, when we do 
manipulate some factor we generally find ourselves changing far more than that single 
factor and its direct consequences. We usually end up changing a number of other 
factors relevant to the effect and very often we change the very principles by which 
these factors operate as well. 
As I noted in Section 1, this is a problem that economists have been sensitive 
too from Mill (1994 [1884]) through the founders of econometrics (especially 
Haavelmo (1997 [1994]) and Frisch (1997 [1938])) to Lucas (1981 [1976]). Perhaps 
that is why it is in economics that we find accounts that connect causation with more 
realistic kinds of manipulations. Consider David Hendry (2000), who sometimes 
suggests that causes are superX, where superX is a combination of X and invariance. 
Hendry’s most developed example involves weak exogeneity and invariance. 
 
Weak Exogeneity:< 
Given P(Y&X,βU) = P(Y/x,)P(x,), x is weakly exogenous to a vector of 
outcomes Y if the parameters  of the marginal distribution have no cross-
restraints with the parameters  of the conditional distribution. 
 
 Weak exogeneity is a nice characteristic because it ensures that the marginal 
distribution can be ignored in estimating the conditional distribution. But it is not 
essential. If we envisage changing x to control the probability of Y, it is the 
conditional distribution itself that matters for our predictions independent of how we 
can learn about it. I follow Hendry in illustrating with a case where the variable (x) we 
envisage manipulating is weakly exogenous to the vector of outcome variables (Y) we 
care about because it makes very clear the importance of the additional invariance 
assumption. 
Suppose we think of changing the distribution of x in order to affect the 
distribution of Y. It may seem that we can predict the outcome from the formula for 
the conditional distribution. But that is not so. Changing  changes the joint 
probability distribution, and there is nothing that ensures that the new distribution will 
still be the same. In the original distribution,  and  may have no dependencies but 
that does not show what happens if the distribution is changed. So Hendry adds a 
constraint and defines: x causes Y if and only if the parameters of P(Y/x) stay fixed as 
we vary the parameters of the distribution of x. In the case where x is weakly 
exogenous to Y, this gives us the notion of super-(weak)exogeneity. 
 
Super-(weak)exogeneity 
Suppose x is weakly exogenous for Y. Then x is super-(weak)exogenous 
relative to a proposed intervention (say a change in γ) if the parameters of 
interest (say β) for P(Y/x,β) do not vary under the intervention. 
 
 I am going to discuss Kevin Hoover’s account of causality. I note here that it 
shares with Hendry’s an important advantage vis-à-vis strategy over the 
Pearl/Woodward/Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines approach. For Hendry, causation is 
characterized relative to a proposed intervention as that intervention will actually 
occur. His definition of causality requires that the relation we should like to use to 
predict the outcomes of our proposed manipulations be invariant under exactly those 
manipulations. The others insist, instead, on the invariance of the relation under 
highly artificial manipulations, manipulations that might occur in a controlled 
experiment to test for a causal connection but would hardly ever be ones we envisage 
for a real application, either in setting policy or in building a device or an institution. 
Unlike the earlier philosophical accounts, the accounts of causality that Hendry and 
Hoover offer show why causal knowledge is good for policy prediction, as we think it 
is, whereas these others do not show this. 
Despite its nice connection with policy prediction, there is a difficulty with 
Hendry’s account, however; it doesn’t seem to be an account of causality at all. That’s 
because of Hendry’s focus on the conditional probability. A factor x we consider 
manipulating to affect Y will do so given Hendry’s invariance assumption just in case 
Y is probabilistically dependent on x. But it is one of the truisms of causal theory that 
probabilistic dependence (correlation) is not causation. 
It is easy to see these points by looking at a case with dichotomous variables. 
By the laws of probability 
 
P(E) = P(E/C)P(C) + P(E/¬C)P(¬C). 
 
In order to increase the probability of E, we consider a manipulation that takes the 
probability P to a new P,' where P' has an increased probability of C. Under Hendry’s 
invariance assumption, P(E/±C) is to stay fixed. So 
 
P'(E) = P(E/C)P'(C) + P(E/¬C)P'(¬C). 
 
So the strategy works just in case P(E/C) > P(E/¬C). From this I conclude that the X 
in Hendry’s account (Causality (relative to G) = superX (relative to G) (i.e., X + 
invariance of X under G)) EDITOR yiu’ve taken out the quote marks here….but the 
phrase needs something more than commas to indicate that I am here reiterating his 
account. And anyway, you didn’t even have a closing comma. On reflection I think 
the parenteses are the best solution can easily be probabilistic relevance. But that’s 
odd because we all believe that probabilistic relevance is not causation and adding on 
that the relevance relations are invariant under some envisaged manipulation does not 
seem to make it so. 
There is a similar difficulty with Hoover. Hoover distinguishes between 
parameters (represented by Greek letters, α, β, γ, . . . ), which we control ‘directly’ 
EDITOR  again ‘scare quotes are required here and again I don’t know if you want to 
use single or double quotes. But one or the other is needed, and variables (represented 
by Latin letters x, y, . . . ), which we do not. He takes the notion of direct control by us 
to be primitive in his account and uses it to define causal relations between quantities 
we cannot directly control. The account is restricted to quantities whose values can be 
fixed, albeit indirectly, by manipulations we can perform. Let Parz stand for the set of 
parameters that determine z. Hoover’s definitions require that 
 
Hoover causation: x causes y iff Parx is a proper subset of Pary. 
 
 So x (Hoover) causes y iff anything we can do to fix the value of x partially 
fixes the value of y but not the reverse. So Hoover’s characterization ensures that 
knowing causal relations allow us to predict the results of manipulations we might 
perform. But as with Hendry this characterization will sometimes count as causes 
factors that would usually be counted as mere correlates. Consider for instance this 
simple arrangement: 
 
<Figure 15.1 about here> 
                                                                       α            β                                                            
                                                                            
                                                                           z  
                                                                                 
                                                           ●  x                  ●  y                                                         
 
      Figure 1 
 
 Here the arrows are meant to represent relations that count as causal by whatever is 
your favourite other characterization of causality; we can for instance imagine 
building a machine with mechanical connections that fits the model in Figure 1. 
We are thus faced with a trade-off. Hendry and Hoover connect causal 
knowledge with the predictability of the results of real manipulations, but they do not 
seem to be real causes; whereas Woodward, Pearl and Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines 
seem to connect real causes with manipulations, but they are not real manipulations. 
 
4. Causality: What Is the Use of It? 
Setting Hoover aside for the moment, there is another problem raised by the 
discussion of the approaches in the last section. Whether we start with real causation 
or some other relation and whether we end up with the ability to predict what happens 
under realistic or under miracle-like manipulations, what makes for the connection 
between the two is invariance. Woodward defines a causal relation as one that is 
invariant under miracle-like manipulations on right-hand-side variables. So clearly a 
Woodward-causal relation will predict accurately what happens under those kinds of 
exotic manipulations. The same is true for Pearl.
6
 Hendry defines a causal relation as 
one that is invariant under various more realistic manipulations. So clearly a Hendry-
causal relation will predict accurately what happens under those more realistic 
manipulations. 
The logic is simple. We have an association. We assume it to be invariant 
under a particular kind of manipulation. So we are able to use that association to 
predict what happens under the specified kind of manipulation.
7
 This logic works no 
matter whether the starting association is causal or not. Hendry’s proposal is a case in 
point. 
What good is causation then? It is generally supposed that there is some 
special connection between causation and policy prediction. Knowing the causal 
relation between two variables is supposed somehow to put us in a better position to 
predict what happens when we manipulate the first than simply knowing some 
arbitrary ‘spurious’ relation between them. But that does not seem to be the case. 
Perhaps, despite my qualms in section 3), modularity is the answer after all. 
Both Woodward and Pearl insist that having the triangular form of a causal system is 
not enough to make a set of associations causal (with which I agree). There must in 
addition, they maintain, be some miracle-like manipulation possible on every variable 
in the system. Perhaps it is this very fact that makes causal knowledge so much more 
useful in general than knowledge of ‘mere correlation.’  
First, I do not think the claim is true. On the modularity thesis a relation is not 
causal unless there is some way to manipulate the cause, no matter how many other 
earmarks of causation the relation has. Nor is it enough that we be able to manipulate 
the cause, which may be hard enough; it must be possible to manipulate it in a very 
specific way—surgically, as if by miracle. I do not see any reason for believing this,8 
other than to satisfy the demand that causes should connect with strategies.
9
 
My second worry is that the proposal does not do the job it is supposed to: It 
does not show what is special about causal relations over spurious ones. The 
modularity solution maintains that if a relation is causal, then there is always some 
manipulation of the cause that leaves that relation invariant, albeit an exotic 
manipulation. Suppose that is true. Then it is equally true for the spurious relation 
between joint effects of a common cause: There is always some manipulation on the 
first that leaves the relation between them invariant. Simply use the miracle-like 
manipulation hypothesized to be always available on the common cause to manipulate 
the first of the two joint effects. (For instance, in Figure 1 jiggle α to manipulate x by 
manipulating z.) This will change the second of the joint effects as well and leave the 
spurious relation between them invariant. Clearly, this manipulation will not itself be 
miracle-like on the first of the two related factors. But if the hope was to argue that 
causal relations are special because there is always at least some manipulation that 
leaves them invariant, miracle-like manipulations seem to have no special place. 
This is indeed my third worry. Miracle-like manipulations of the kind under 
consideration are great for finding out about causal relations since they are the kinds 
of manipulations we would wish to make in a controlled experiment. But, as I urged 
in Section 3, they are not the manipulations we envisage in policy and technology. 
Yet we do think knowing causal relations is especially useful for planning. The 
possibility of invariance under miracle-like manipulations does not account for this. 
An alternative to the modularity thesis that could explain the practical 
usefulness of causal knowledge would be to argue that causal relations are more likely 
to be stable than are mere correlations. This might be supported by my own 
observations that we often build both devices and institutions with shields to protect 
the structural arrangements from disruptions (Cartwright, 2007; 1989). But I cannot 
see how to use this to support the distinction I am looking for. Once a shield has been 
put in place to protect the internal arrangements of a structure, then causal relations 
and mere correlations may be equally stable. For instance, imagine that a shield is 
built around  x,y,z, and β and their causal connections in Figure 1, allowing only the 
influence of  to penetrate. Then the spurious relation between x and y will be just as 
stable as that between z or β and y.  
Conversely, one of the special worries in policy that we have noted is that 
causal relations are often not all that stable under manipulation. Not only is this the 
core of the famous Lucas critique; it was central to the philosophy of John Stuart Mill. 
It was, for instance, an important support for Mill’s opposition to the subjugation of 
women. Mill admitted that, under the contemporary structure, putting women into 
positions of authority might well not produce good outcomes. But that, he maintained, 
would most probably change if the institutions of society changed to provide women 
the education and opportunity that would allow them to develop and exercise their 
native capacity for independent and creative thought (Guillin 2006). 
In the end, the claim that causal relations are in themselves more stable than 
spurious ones seems too vague and too weak to serve as a defense of the vast effort 
we put into trying to secure causal knowledge. What seems true is that knowing 
causal relations is hugely useful for planning and prediction whenever we can add on 
the assumption that they will be stable. Nor is there anything wrong with an account 
of causation that needs to add this on. As Kevin Kelly
10
 has pointed out, it is equally 
true of theories of mechanics (indeed, any theory for that matter) that they need what 
(following Wilfrid Sellars) I call theory-exit assumptions if they are to be put to use. 
The problem is that this does not seem to distinguish between causal and 
noncausal relations. A simple kind of Humean view does better: If a causal relation is 
a universal association—it always holds whenever the cause occurs—then, clearly, 
causal relations are sure predictors. But this is not the case with any of our 
contemporary theories of causality. It seems that causal relations will provide secure 
predictions about what happens under manipulations just in case they are invariant 
under those manipulations. But so, too, will noncausal relations. Why then do we take 
causal knowledge to be so much more useful than knowledge of other relations? 
My worries here are not that we can find no difference between stable causal 
relations and other stable relations vis-à-vis manipulation. Consider a situation in 
which neither x nor y occurs but in which the principle “x causes y” holds. In this 
case, if we can change from not ¬x to x, leaving the principle that x causes y 
unchanged, then we can ensure not only that y changes but also that it is x that 
changes it. This contrasts with the relation between x and y in Figure 2. There if we 
change from ¬x to x, y changes as well. But the change from ¬x to x will not cause the 
change in y. We do not change y through changing x. This difference may be 
important ontologically. But it goes no way toward explaining why causal knowledge 
should be especially useful for prediction and control, worth buying at great cost. 
 
5. Are Both Invariance and Causality Red Herrings? 
Sandra Mitchell (2003) points out that any true claim can be useful. Suppose we 
follow her lead. Perhaps causation and invariance are not the best keys to good 
prediction; they certainly are not the most direct. The simplest claim that will allow us 
to predict what will happen under manipulation is a true claim that describes just that. 
This is in essence what Hoover-causation consists of. Causal claims, in 
Hoover’s use of the term causal, describe what will happen under the manipulations 
we can perform. His account thus has the advantage over the other accounts discussed 
here. With Hendry it focuses on the kinds of manipulations we might actually carry 
out and does not restrict itself to miracle-like interventions. But it is more general. 
Hendry-causation secures prediction when a relation that predicts the outcome under 
current arrangements continues to occur under the proposed manipulation. Hoover-
causation looks instead directly for information about what will happen given the 
manipulation. It does not depend on associations from the past continuing to hold 
across interventions. 
Of course there is a sense in which this advantage is illusory. For nothing 
about Hoover-causation suggests how we are to come up with a Hoover-causal claim. 
But it can point us to an important lesson. Mill taught that economics cannot be an 
inductive science. Economic arrangements shift regularly in ways we generally 
cannot predict, and recent economics has made a point of how much more likely this 
is when interventions occur. Accounts that rely on invariance run just counter to 
Mill’s cautions. Induction is what they offer, though with an explicit admission of 
Mill’s worries, namely, use the associations of the past for future predictions, but use 
them only when they will continue to hold. We need something better. 
Hendry himself is attentive to the fact that existing economic relations cannot 
be relied on to hold under manipulation. When it comes to forecasting, the use of 
causal models—even very accurate ones—can be dangerous, he warns, and for the 
very reasons that worried Mill: The arrangements correctly described in a causal 
model at one time are not likely to stay fixed across time. In his recent forecasting 
work Hendry develops a number of alternative modeling strategies that can be shown 
to give more accurate predictions across time if certain specified kinds of changes are 
occurring (Hendry & Mizon 2005; Andrews & Stock 2005). 
What is surprising is that Hendry urges that these models may be good for 
forecasting but not for planning. Presumably that is because he imagines that the 
kinds of changes generally envisaged in planning are not the kinds that his strategies 
for forecasting deal with. What, then, do we do for planning? What kind of evidence 
will support policy and technology predictions and how is it to be marshalled and 
evaluated? That is the challenge, and it is an especially pressing one now that the call 
everywhere is for evidence-based policy. As methodologists we need to offer good 
counsel about just what counts as evidence when predictions about the effects of 
interventions are at stake, and about how to use that evidence. I do not think we have 
enough to say. 
My conclusions in this chapter about the usefulness of causal knowledge are 
unfortunately negative. First, surprisingly, causation (at least under conceptions of it 
of the kind discussed here) seems irrelevant for reliable prediction in policy and 
technology planning. Causation without invariance will not do the job, and any 
invariant relation will provide reliable predictions regardless of whether it is causal.  
Second, invariance may be a good tool but, as Mill taught, it is altogether too rare and 
too unpredictable to do much for us. If we need to rely on invariance, we will not get 
very far, and the focus on it may distract attention from the fundamental challenge: to 
develop and understand methods—generally applicable methods—for evaluating 




Overall my discussion raises a disturbing question. Causal knowledge is hard won. 
We spend a great deal of effort to achieve it. But what is the use of it once we have it? 
Invariance fares little better since it can generally not be relied on in economic policy 
considerations. What can we offer that is better? 
Notes 
 
1. Research for this piece was assisted by the AHRC-sponsored project 
Contingency and Dissent in Science. I would especially like to thank Damien Fennell 
and Bengt Autzen for their help. 
 2. Because of my pluralist views about causality, I would more accurately say 
“a genuine test for one significant kind of causal relation.” 
 3. Probably we shall really want to be exporting the conclusion to another 
population as well, not just to the same population under different policies, and that is 
clearly an even stronger move. 
 4. That is, any variable that appears as an effect in a law in the system of laws. 
 5. Actually, he gives the same reason—causes must be usable to manipulate 
their effects—for both level invariance and for modularity. I cite it only for 
modularity because level invariance does not provide manipulability unless 
modularity is added, and I, at any rate, have an alternative defense of level invariance. 
 6. Recall, Pearl demands of any equation in the causal system that it be 
invariant when the laws that determine the direct causes in that equation are replaced 
by laws that set the values of those direct causes at any arbitrary value. 
 7. A similar claim is true for Glymour, Spirtes, and Scheines, though their 
scheme is more complicated and provides more complicated inferences. (This is true, 
too, for Pearl when it comes to his full counterfactual account.) They begin with a 
mixed set of causal and probabilistic claims and then tell how to calculate what 
happens to various probabilities under certain miracle-like manipulations—but only 
supposing that the relations that support the calculation are invariant. 
 8. I argue for this more extensively in Cartwright (2001) 
 9. This indeed is how Pearl does defend it. 
 10. Kelly raised this point at my Center for Philosophy of Science lecture at 
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